As it was held that the report did indeed fall within the remit of Parliamentary proceedings, it was then to determine whether its admittance as evidence would be to ‘<em>impeach</em>’ or ‘<em>question</em>’ the proceedings of Parliament and therefore be inadmissible as evidence under the rules of Parliamentary privilege.

The court found this a more complex problem to grapple with. Whilst noting that it was plain to see why attaching the risk of civil or criminal liability to a NAO report could potentially undermine the candour of an author, the court considered it less immediately obvious that a factual disagreement with the contents of a report would have the same effect. In particular, with respect to bodies like the NAO, the court considered that ‘professionals’ working for such bodies would likely be familiar with reasoned disagreement with their professionally held opinions and should therefore not be dissuaded from speaking their mind in fear of being later disagreed with. The court struggled to see why reasoned disagreement with factual evidence should be construed as interfering with the functioning of Parliament.

In spite of this somewhat rebellious opinion, the court decided that authoritative precedent had already – quite clearly – determined the opposite, i.e. that ‘<em>challenging the “veracity” of proceedings in Parliament included any challenge to the “accuracy” of things said as part of such proceedings</em>’. The NAO report could therefore not be admitted as evidence to establish contested facts as to do so would be to invite the other party or the court to <em>question</em> or <em>impeach</em> the accuracy of something ‘said’ in Parliament.

The court did note, however, that Parliamentary proceedings – such as NAO reports – will often provide a helpful resource in judicial proceedings, but only to the extent that the facts are agreed between the parties.